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Today the use of the corporation as the mode in which to conduct
business has reached fad proportions. Lawyers advise incorporation for its
supposed tax advantages and limited liability, but without due regard for the
problems that continuity and permanence of corporate ekistence may create
when conflict among the parties arises. This is reflected in the increasing
number of cases involving dissension among corporate directors and share-
holders that have been taken to court. Another indication of the incidence
of these cases has been the adoption by many states of "deadlock" statutes
to meet the rising need for relief in such matters.
Conflicts in control and conduct of corporations most often arise in
"closed" corporations. Though these are often those of only a few share-
holders, the best working definition of closed corporation for present
purposes is that of close identification of ownership and management.' It
is in such corporations that personality clashes most often reflect themselves
in ways that impair the proper functioning of the corporation. The
clearest situation is the deadlock resulting from evenly split corporate
ownership and/or control. When the two sides come to a prolonged
disagreement, the result is fairly obvious: the ability of the board to make
policy is ended, the stockholders have no ability to elect successors, and
the operation of the' corporation, if any, is left in the hands of the officers,
removed from the supervision of the stockholders.1"
*Prepared for the seminar: Planning and Counseling for the Closed Corporation,
April 1958, Harvard Law School.
**Member of the Florida Bar; A. B. Emory, 1955; LL. B., Harvard, 1958.
1. Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORN. L. Q. 488 (1948).
la. As to the power of a president to act for a corporation when the board is
deadlocked, see Note, 9 SYRACUSE L. REv. 296 (1958); and 2 FLETCHER, CoRPo~rONs
§ 619.1 (rev. vol. 1954).
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A less obvious but no less important cause of corporate paralysis is
the stalemate which arises when more than a majority is required for
corporate or shareholder action, and a fraction of less than 500 can "veto"
such actions. Despite a lack of case or statutory authority, very possibly
super-statutory majorities for shareholder and director action are valid in
Florida. Under section 608.03(2)(j) of the Florida statutes, a corporate
charter can include anything the parties desire. 2 But, section 608.09 requires
that a corporation act through its board of directors, and specifies that the
board acts by a majority. If this clause is mandatory, it would override the
general language of 608.03(2) (j). THie sentence on director action is
preceded by a like provision for quorums, with an introductory proviso
to this sentence specifically allowing the charter to provide for more than
a majority to make up quorums, if desired. 3 The explicitness of the
requirement that a board acts by a majority, and the juxtaposed clause
specifying that a quorum can be had by other than a majority, if desired,
casts doubt on the ability to subject board action in Florida to a super-
majority proviso. But, of course, the extra-majority quorum in itself may
provide a method by which the incorporators can require vetoes for board
action. And veto provisions might still be made for shareholder action. The
chance thht vetoes can and will be used at board and shareholder level as
a control device is sufficient to justify treating them as a potential problem
in Florida.4
Other possible sources of dissension are those statute sections that
allow extra-majority approval by the shareholders for certain types of
corporate action. If, for example, the corporation is set up to buy and sell
a particular asset, section 608.19 would allow the charter to specify a
super-majority for approval of the asset's sale, and the chance of a stalemate
is clear."
2. FLA. STAT. § 608.03 (2)(J) (1957).
(2) '1'he articles of incorporation shall contain:
(J) any provision which the incorporators may choose to insert for the
regulation of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the
corporation and any provisions creating, dividing, limiting and regulating
the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders ....
As we shall see later in discussing "planning," this may not mean what it says.
BALLANTINE CORPORATIONS § 16 (rev. ed. 1946).
3. FLA. STAT. § 608.09 (1957):
(1) The business of every corporation shall be managed and its corporate
powers exercised by a board of not less than three directors ...
unless the certificate of incorporation or by-laws provide otherwise, the
presence of a majority of all the directors shall be necessary at any
meeting to constitute a quorum to transact business. The act of a
majority of directors present at a meeting where a quorum is present
shall be the act of the board of directors .....
4. See O'Neal, Moulding the Corporate Form to Particular Business Situations:
Optional Charter Clauses, 10 VANDERBILT L. REv. 1 (1956) on the permissible content
of such "optional clauses" provisions as FLA. STAT. § 608.03 (2) (J). On the allowability
of vetoes generally, see O'Neal, Giving Shareholders Power to Veto Corporate Decisions:
Use of Special Charter and By-law Provisions, 18 LAw & CONTFMP. PROB. 451 (1953).
5. Other Florida provisions specifically allowing a charter to require super-majorities
include: FLA. STAT. . 608.18 (amendments), § 608.10(4) (quorum for shareholder-




Yet a fourth possible type of conflict is that of long continued and
smouldering friction and disagreement over corporate policy, which never
attains the dignity of a stalemate or deadlock, and so never paralyzes
the corporation, but does in fact sap its strength and vitiate much of its
effectiveness.6 It is submitted that this is one of the most important of
the problems in the field, and also the one least likely to be solved judicially
or legislatively: The statutes will not cover this situation until it actually
paralyzes the corporation, and little aid is available to an aggrieved minority
in equity. It is here that relief must come through planning, if at all.
It is the purpose of this paper to survey the status of closed corporation
discord in Florida. It will first consider the relief available in equity, and
by statute, and then suggest methods of avoiding such conflicts or making
relief more certain by advance planning.7 Borrowing from the Maryland
court, the term "deadlock" will be used all through the paper to signify
the situation in which a corporation "because of the decision or indecision
of the shareholders, cannot perform its corporate powers."8
Assuming that the parties to a Florida corporation have managed,
through use of an appropriate control device and subsequent disagreement,
to attain a posture of deadlock, the question becomes what relief is available
to them. In Florida, their judicial aid must stem either from the Legislature's
"deadlock" statute, or from the power inherent in a court of equity. For
the present it can be assumed that the statute has not occupied the field
and so divested equity of its jurisdiction, nor covered all the possible
deadlock situations.
II. INHERENT EQUITY POWER
When a corporation becomes the victim of discord, its shareholders
may seek their relief in a court of equity, petitioning the chancellor's
intervention to preserve their property interests even though shrouded in
corporate form. The basic difficulty in invoking this equity jurisdiction
is that the courts are reluctant to interfere with the internal management
of a corporation. This is not to say that they will not intervene in a proper
case, but insofar as the relief sought is a substitution of a receiver's judg-
ment. for that of the dissension-ridden owner's in order to obviate the
paralysis, but continue the corporation, the court seldom intervenes., And
when the relief sought is not a continuation of the corporation free from
6. Cf. lsraels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock
and Dissolution, 19 U. or Cni. L. REv. 778, 781 (1952).
7. Arbitration as a solution to the problems of corporate deadlock will not be handled
by this paper, though it has been suggested as a very feasible way to handle prospective
dissension. O'Neal, Resolving Disputes in Closely Held Corporations: Intra-Institutional
Arbitration, 67 HARv. L. REv. 786 (1954). The Florida Legislature in 1957 substantially
revised the Florida Arbitration Code, and the new statute, 57-502, seems closer to the
Uniform Arbitration Act and deserves independent study.
8. Surgical Instrument Co. v. Requardt, 180 Md. 245, 253, 23 A.2d 697, 700
(1942 Cf. FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 7712 (penn. ed. 1942).
1959]
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deadlock, but a wiping clean of the slate by giving the owners back their
investment, and freeing them from the corporate form, the very harshness
of the remedy gives the court pause. 10
Several types of relief are available to an aggrieved shareholder. The
emphasis of this discussion will be on the appointment of an equity
receiver, a) for dissolution, b) for winding up and liquidation, and
c) pendente lite to preserve the corporate assets. Almost always joined
in the plea for relief are requests for injunction, to forestall further
improper activity in regard to corporate assets; and for accounting to force
a regurgitation of that improperly taken. To the extent that such relief
is itself adequate to solace the complained of ills, it will usually preclude
the appointment of a receiver."
The several types of receivership must be distinguished as to scope
and effect. That most commonly invoked in a deadlock situation is for
winding up and liquidation. This leaves the corporate form existent, but
distributes the assets to the shareholders, and so amounts to a de facto
dissolution. 2 The de jure dissolution as such, entailing the legal death
of the corporation by the cancellation of its right to exist, and termination
of its charter, is almost always unavailable due to a judicial misconception
of the nature of the corporation.' 8
Originally corporations were the result of special grants from the
legislature. Accordingly, the courts took the view that what the sovereign had
given, only the sovereign could take away. They refused to end a corporate
life except in response to action by the state itself, or by authority of statute."4
The rationale of this view is subject to serious doubt in this era of general
corporate enabling statutes, 15 changes in business customs that make equity
more active to correct corporate abuses,16 and the ready ability of other
business forms to dissolve at will.'7 Perhaps the final blow to its logic is
the existence of voluntary dissolution statutes, like Florida's 608.27 which
allows shareholders to dissolve a corporation without even a judicial
decree.' 8 Nevertheless, rarely, if at all, will a court actually order dissolution
10. See Note, Receivership and Dissolution as Remedies for Management Deadlock,
47 Micn. L. Rev. 684, 689-92 (1949).
11. News-Journal Corp. v. Core, 147 Fla. 217, 2 So.2d 741 (1941), Hammond v.
Hammond, 216 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). See Patton v. Nicholas, 154
Teax. 385, 279 S.W.2d 848 (1955).
12. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 304 (rev. ed. 1946).
13. Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse- Judicial Power to Wind Up a
Corporation at the Suit of a Minority Stockholder, 40 CoIxut. L. REv. 220 (1940).
14. Ibid.
15. Lichens Co. v. Standard Commercial Tobacco Co., 28 Del. Ch. 220, 251,
40 A.2d 447, 452 (1944).
16. Levant v. Kowal, 350 Mich. 232, 86 N.W.2d 336 (1957).
17. See Lieberbaum v. Levine, 54 So.2d 159 (Fa. 1951); Reed v. Beale, 77 Fla.
801, 82 So. 234 (1919).




of a solvent going corporation. 19 Instead, the courts somewhat hypocritically
grant a liquidation of the corporation, and distribution of its assets to the
shareholders in situations where the logical remedy is dissolution alto-
gether.
20
In years past, it was generally considered that a court of equity, absent
statutory authority, had no power to liquidate a solvent, going corporation
on the suit of a minority shareholder. 2' Exceptions to this rule have come
to be recognized. In Florida, it would seem that equity will liquidate a
corporation when a) it has disposed of its principal business or otherwise
accomplished all its purposes,22 b) the officers are wasting assets, mis-
managing the corporation and no other remedy will protect the share-
holders,2 3 e) there has been a complete frustration of the corporate purpose
and inability to continue its functions-in short, where the corporation is
unable for some reason to operate. 24
As these exceptions developed in the several jurisdictions, it has been
increasingly held that dissension and deadlock is itself an independent
ground for liquidation. 25 But it would seem that this is still by far the
minority view, despite the logic of recognizing that dissolution can as
effectively vitiate the usefulness of the corporate form as can the better
known "exceptions." 26 In any case this dissension must be more than
dissatisfaction; it must be paralysis.
Today, equity courts generally recognize their power to liquidate a
going concern, even absent statutory authority, though few will actually
decree dissolution. The real question today is whether a sufficient case has
been made out to justify the granting of such a stringent remedy.2 7 Generally
equity discretion will not honor a petition based on deadlock alone.28
19. 4 AM. Jua. Corporations § 1322. For cases where dissolution seemingly was
granted, see Cowin v. Salmon, 248 Ala. 580, 28 So.2d 633 (1946), Green v. National
Advertising & A. Co., 137 Minn. 65, 162 N.W. 1056 (1917).
20. Bowen v. Flour Mills Corp., 114 Kan. 95, 217 Pac. 301 (1923); Nashville
Packet Co. v. Neville, 144 Tenn. 698, 235 S.W. 64 (1921).
21. 4 AM. JUtR. Corporations § 1323.
22. See Tampa Waterworks v. Wood, 97 Fla. 495, 121 So. 789 (1929).
23. See Tampa Waterworks v. Wood, supra note 22, and Mills Development Co.
v. Shipp and Head, Inc., 126 Fla. 470, 171 So. 533 (1936).
24. See Mills Development Co. v. Shipp and Head, Inc., supra note 23, and Finn
Bondholders v. Dukes, 157 Fla. 642, 26 So. 802 (1946).
25. Such seems to be the holdings in the following cases. Nevertheless, the value
of "boiler-plate" allegations should not be gainsaid, since the courts still prefer to talk
in terms of oppression, frustration, or fraud. Levant v. Kowa], so pra note 16, Bowen v.
Flour Mills, supra note 20, Cowin v. Salmon, supra note 19, Flemming v. Heffner &
Flemming, 263 Mich. 561, 248 N.W. 900 (1953). See Krall v. Krall, 141 Conn. 325,
106 A.2d 165 (1954) (Under general receivership statute).
26. See cases cited note 25 supra.
27. See Note, Receivership and Dissolution as Remedies for Management Deadlock,
47 MICH. L. RS1. 684 (1949).
28. Ibid. and Freedman v. Fox, 67 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1953); Hanes v. Watkins,
63 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1953): Note that these Florida cases may only be holding that
on the facts of each, the deadlock is not sufficiently severe, since each recognizes a right
to liquidate a corporation that is unable completely to-function.
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But if the dissension ground is joined with one of the better recognized
grounds, such as frustration of corporate purpose, relief is more often
granted.2
9
The Florida court has often acknowledged its power to liquidate,
albeit framing instances of such as exceptions from the general rule. 0
However, as is generally held in American cases, dissension alone is not a
sufficient reason to justify a winding up.3 ' Actually it would seem that a severe
deadlock is only another form of waste of the corporate assets, since it
causes corporate inaction, stagnation, and idleness of the assets, while taxes
eat into the capital?.2 Perhaps the courts may also come to explicitly
recognize that a serious deadlock can effectively frustrate the corporate
purpose or halt its ability to function.33 By this process of pouring new
wine into old bottles, the reluctance to recognize dissension as such might
be overcome.
It should be noted that the rules for deadlocks are often thought
to be the same as those applied in a minority stockholder suit. But in an
even deadlock, the petitioner is not an actual minority owner? 4 And even
if he were factually such, as in a stalemate case, he seems entitled to the
higher consideration of a shareholder able to affect corporate action. As
a countervailing consideration, some courts invoke "clean hands," demanding
that the plaintiff not be maliciously inclined or more responsible than the
defendant for the deadlock.35 Neither of those factors is uniformly recog-
nized, and one can only guess at their weight in a particular case.
The Florida court has twice in recent years denied liquidation in
suits based on deadlock and dissension. In Hanes v. Watkins," a 49%
shareholder asked for dissolution of a prosperous and going corporation,
claiming only disruptive dissension. The court denied such relief, saying:
"[There has been] . . . no showing that the corporation has
reached such a stage that the purposes for which it was formed
are impossible of attainment, or that the corporation has prac-
tically discontinued all its business, or that there is such a deadlock





29. See notes 27 and 28 supra.
30. Tampa Waterworks v. Wood, 97 Fla. 493, 121 So. 789 (1929); News.Journal v.
Core, 147 Ila. 217, 2 So.2d 741 (1941).
31. Not, at least, until it attains the status of paralysis. See note 28, suf'ra.
32. See Guaranty Laundry v. Pulliam, 200 Okla. 185, 191 P.2d 975 (1948).
33. In Levant v. Kowal, supra 350 Mich. 232, 86 N.W.2d 336, 342.3 (1957),
the Michigan court recognizes that dissension rarely, if ever, stands alone, but is normally
"accompanied by circumstances of financial loss, corporate paralysis, mismanagement
and deterioration of property."
34. Bowen v. Flour Mills, 114 Kan. 95, 217 Pac. 301 (1923); Levant v. Kowal
350 Mich. 232, 86 N.W.2d 336 (1957); lemming v. Heffner & Flemming, 263
Mich. 561, 248 N.W. 900 (1953).
35. See 47 Mxci. L. REV. at 691; Reid Drug Co. v .Saly, 268 Ky. 522, 105 S.W.2d
625 (1937) and cf. Stott Realty v. Orloff, 262 Mich. 375, 247 N.W. 698 (1953).
36.63 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1953).
37. Id. at 628.
[VOL.. XlI
CLOSED CORPORATIONS
In Freedman v. Fox,"" liquidation was denied the one half owner of a
solvent hotel corporation who claimed no majority vote of the board could
be achieved because of internal dissension between the two shareholding
families as to: repair of the lobby TV set, manner of treating guests, and
apportionment of the work load. Again the court noted that such a showing
of discord is not sufficient for liquidation. The corporate affairs must
be such that its purposes cannot be achieved and it cannot be made to
function.
The court in the Freedman case also noted that it was too late then to
treat the corporation as a partnership, and so make available to the parties
the dissolution they would automatically be entitled to as partners. 9 Since
the corporation was chartered by the state, contracted and incurred debts
as such, and in all respects operated in a corporate capacity, the court chose
not to allow the parties to disregard the corporate fiction at that late stage.
This reluctance to consider the shareholders as parties may wel reflect
the Florida court's general attitude toward affording partnership advantages
to the parties in a closed corporation. Several courts in other jurisdictions
have recognized that in a dissolution situation the parties can be treated
as partners. 0 There is some Florida authority supporting this view, 41 but
the court is evidently determined to be eclectic in handling this factor.
It is submitted that most of those ensnarled in the web of disillusion
would have gone into a partnership, "but for" the tax and limited liability
advantages inherent in the corporate form. It seems more realistic to ,regard
these people as partners in a deadlock situation, and not to shrug off their
predicament with the high sounding maxim, non fit volenti injuria. As
partners they would be entitled to dissolution on request, and no valid reason
suggests itself for now binding them to a business life of turmoil and unrest
and penalizing them for utilizing the corporate form.
42
There are two Florida cases which granted a liquidation form of relief
in a deadlock situation, but not as such. The peculiar means used in these
cases to effectuate a desirable end was to continue the corporate form
but partition the assets and distribute them among the shareholders. In
Woford v. Wofford,4 3 two brothers owned the shares of a hotel corporation.
The business was actually conducted as a partnership and the corporation
used only for the issuance of bonds. In a suit claiming only deadlock, the
38. 67 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1953).
39. Lieberbaum v. Levine, 54 So.2d 159 (Fla. 1951); Read v. Beals, 77 Fla.
801, 82 So. 234 (1919).
40. Flemming v. H-effner & Flemming, 265 Mich. 561, 248 N.W. 900 (1953);
Green v. National Advertising & A. Co., 137 Minn. 65, 162 N.W. 1056 (1917).
Application of Pivot Punch & Die Corporation, 182 N.YS. 2d 459 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
41. Wofford v. Wofford, 129 Fla. 445, 176 So. 499 (1937).
42. Cf. Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse - judicial Power to Wind Up
a Corporation at the Suit of a Minority, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 220 (1940); Note, 36
TEXAs L. REv. 660 (1958).
43. See note 41 supra.
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court granted a decree of partition, ordering the property to be sold intact
and its proceeds divided. The court found such dissension that it concluded
that the purpose of organization had ceased; and that since joint future
management of the property was hopeless, the assets could only be preserved
by in effect distributing them pro rata. Clearly the result is the same as if
the chancellor had merely appointed a receiver to liquidate the corporation
and distribute its assets. Nevertheless the court chose to label its remedy
as partition, and it is still unclear what weight this case had as precedent
in a less appealing factual context not susceptible to partition and in which
the corporate form was actually used as such.
In Kay v. Key West Development Co.,"4 the court again explicitly
preserved the corporate entity, and on the authority of Wofford, granted
relief to the deadlocked shareholders as if they were tenants in common.
This case involved a realty corporation whose purpose was to hold and sell
land, and its shareholders could not reach agreement on the disposition
of the land it held for sale. Tie court declared that since it was impossible
for the parties to reach an agreement, and since they were both desirous
of disposing of the asset as the corporation was designed to do, partition
should be as available to the parties as if they were legal concurrent owners
who could not agree on the method of disposition, and this legal title in the
corporation should not stymie them. Yet the court said "it is not necessary
in granting such relief to dissolve the corporation. Neither do we feel that
intervention .. is in any way meddling with the internal affairs of corporate
management. 4  The state of the law in Florida seems to be this: equity will
grant liquidation when it is confronted with a corporation whose purpose
is completely frustrated, or which cannot be made to function-in short,
one that is so paralyzed as to be in its death throes. In addition, equity
may grant partition of assets for less reason and a smaller amount of
dissension, if the parties never used the corporate form, or if the corporate
purpose had the same objective of sale and distribution of the assets that
the partition furnishes."0
For a corporation torn by dissension, yet a third type of receiver may
be available in Florida. Although it is a general rule that equity will not
interfere with the internal management of a corporation, in cases where
the acts complained of are of such a nature as to pose a serious immediate
threat to the safety of the corporate assets, equity will appoint a receiver
pendente lite to preserve the interests of the shareholders pending liquida-
44. 72 So.2d 786 (la. 1954).
45. Id. at 789.
46. Cf. Application of Fulton-Washington Corporation, 3 Misc. 2d 277, 151
N.Y.S.2d 417 (1956), aff'd, 2 A.1.2d 981, 157 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1956) (noting that
dissolution of a corporation set up only to buy. improve, and sell land, and then be




tion, or until the cause of the danger is obviated.4" This is a delicately used
power which is applied in equity discretion only to prevent fraud or
imminent harm to the members' interests."' Generally it is an ancillary
remedy, and not available unless: a) the principal relief sought is sufficiently
meritorious to overcome equity's reluctance to interfere in the normal
operation of a corporation,49 b) the individual defendant is insolvent, 0
c) no other remedy will adequately preserve the status quo.51 The Florida
court has repeatedly emphasized that even such a temporary receiver is
not available for mere insolvency of a corporation, 2 or just because it can
do no harm, 53 or for some indefinite purpose. 4 Although no Florida case
seems to grant a pendente lite receiver for dissension alone,55 it might
be more readily available in such a situation than a winding up receiver
because it is "weaker medicine."5' 6
One other possible theory of equity relief to deadlocked stockholders
should be noted. The directors occupy at least a quasi fiduciary relation-
ship to the shareholders. Among their duties is that of conducting the
business honestly, and in the shareholders' best interests. Though business
judgment is theirs alone, and generally not reviewable, they must not
act arbitrarily, oppressively, or to their own advantages.57 Under the
voluntary dissolution statute, 8 the board can adopt a dissolution resolution
for shareholder approval. This resolution of dissolution is itself a transaction
of corporate business,50 and the board must handle this power with as
much regard for the shareholder's rights as, for example, payment of
compensation. If the board deliberately fails to dissolve the corporation in
47. West Coast Hospital Ass'n. v. Hoare, 64 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1953); Apalachicola
N. Ry. v. Sommers, 79 Fla. 816, 85 So. 361 (1920).
48. Macon Lumber Co. v. Bishop & Collins, 229 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1956); Mc-
Allister Hotel v. Schatzberg, 40 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1949).
49. Savageau v. Savageau, 132 Colo. 75, 285 P.2d 810 (1955).
50. McAllister Hotel v. Schatzberg, note 48 supra; Jones v. Harvey, 82 So.2d 371
(Fla. 19551.
51. McAllister Hotel v. Schatzberg, supra note 50. (No difficulty finding or collecting
a judgment from the individual defendant, G. David Shine, Sr., and injunction otherwise
sufficient); Strong v. Broward County Kennel Club, 65 F. Stipp. 407 (S.D.Fla. 1946)
(allows injunction and accounting, denies receiver); Akers v. Corbett, 138 Fla. 130, 190
So. 28 (1939) (accounting sufficient to effectuate parties' rights).
52. Armour Fertilizer Works v. First Nat'l Bank, 87 Fla. 436, 100 So. 362 (1924).
53. Apalachicola N. Ry. v. Sommers, 79 Fla. 816, 85 So. 361 (1920).
54. Akers v. Corbett, 138 Fla. 130, 190 So. 28 (1939).
55. Compare Boyle v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 671, 170 Pac. 1140 (1917),
where dissension among the parties made it impossible for the corporation to carry on
its business at all, and a pendente lite receiver was upheld; and Southern Maryland
Agricultural Ass'n v. Magruder, 198 Md. 274, 81 A 2d 592 (1951).
56. Steinberg v. Wolff, 56 N.J. Ch 555, 52 At]. 1078 (1898); Tampa Water-
works v. Wood, infra note 57; 47 Micn. L. R~v. 684 (1949). Cf. Patton v. Nicholas,
154 Tex. 385, 279 S.W.2d 848 (1955).
57. Flight Equipment & Engineering Corp. v. Shelton. 103 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1958);
Orlando Orange Groves v. Hale, 107 Fla. 304, 144 So. 674 (1932); See Tampa
Waterworks v. Wood, 97 la. 493, 120 So. 789 (1929).
58. FLA. STAT. § 608.27 (1957).
59. Boure v. Muskegon Circuit Judge, 327 Mich. 175, 190, 41 N.W.2d 515
(1950).
1959]
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the situations where that is the only proper action, they have breached
their duty to the shareholders. The conclusion of the argument is that
corporate deadlocks on the board or among the shareholders are such
a threat to the utility of the corporation that the only proper course for
the directors to take is to vote to dissolve. Thus the shareholders would
be able to force equity to have them so act by an appropriate decree. Some
decisions have accepted this theory in breach of trust situations, 60 but despite
its appealing logic, it would be without precedent in a Florida deadlock case.
On balance, it would seem that a court should decree liquidation for
dissension that does or inevitably must completely disrupt the corporation's
affairs. Weighed against the traditional equity reluctance to interfere with
corporate operations should be a realistic appraisal of the ability of the
parties to reconcile their differences and make the corporation work as
such. Ultimately, little is gained by forcing "partners" to live together in
a business that no longer fits their needs. Today's courts are inclined to
base their decisions as to liquidation on the condut of the parties and the
condition of the corporation." They might do well to also appraise the
people involved, and their need of an opportunity to start over.
III. THE FLORIDA DEADLOCK STATUTE
In 1953 The Florida Legislature adopted what has become popularly
known as a deadlock statute.62 This statute seems basically designed to
60. Compare Kroger v. Jaburg, 231 App. Div. 641, 248 N.Y. Supp. 387 (1931)
business obsolete and couldn't be run at a profit, directors still taking salaries and
epleting assets); and Lennan v. Blakely, 273 App. Div. 767, 75 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1947)
(directors continuing existence of corporation for sole purpose of benefiting those in control
at expense of other shareholders), with Fontheim v. Walker, 283 App. Div. 373, 122
N.Y.S.2d 642 (1953); denying relief for disagreement on business judgment. The court
distinguished the earlier New York cases as involving breaches of trust by the majority
and noted the dissolution of the corporation was not more in the stockholder interest
than its continuation. See Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems
of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. OF Ci. L. REv. 778, 799 (1952). "The fact that
in New York and in Michigan directors alone can file for dissolution without shareholder
approval has led the courts of those states to require the directors so to file in cases
where the facts showed both recuring losses and abuse of managerial perogatives." It is
submitted that the difference in the Florida statutory scheme does not vitiate the force of
the theory.
61. N.Y. LAw REV. COMM. REPORT, Doc. 65k (1944).
62. FLA. STAT. § 608.28 Dissolution Where Opposing Ownership Interests Evenly
Divided.
When the total stock voting power is evenly divided into two independent owner-
ships or interests, and the number of directors is even and equally divided respecting
the management of the corporation with one-half of the ownership favoring the course
advocated by one-half of the directors, and the other half of the ownership favoring the
course of the other half, or where the ownership is equally divided and the number of
directors is uneven, but the two halves of the ownership are unable to agree on or elect
successor directors and the old directors are holding over, the circuit court, sitting in
chancery, may entertain a petition from any stockholder for involuntary dissolution of
the corporation. If, after hearing thereon, the court finds that the division of ownership
is equal and cannot be reconciled, he may appoint a receiver or trustee of the corporation
and enter an order that it be dissolved ...
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meet the situation of equally divided opposing ownership interests, and is
probably modeled after such statutes as that in New Jersey,63 the old New
York statute, 4 or the Uniform Business Corporation Act.05 It has not as
yet been definitely explained by the Florida courts and it would seem that
there are several real questions as to its coverage and application yet to
be answered."0
Occupation of the Field
Since the scope of the statute's coverage seems narrow, it is altogether
likely that parties desiring relief who cannot fit themselves under the exact
statutory language will continue to seek relief from equity's inherent
receivership power. This leads into the puzzling question of whether the
statute has "occupied the field." In other words, has the legislature intended
the statutory remedy for a dissension-ridden corporation to be the only
and exclusive remedy available to the shareholders, thereby divesting equity
of its general power to wind up a corporation, or is it just a cumulative
remedy added to that already available at equity?
Decisions in other jurisdictions are split on this point. The New York
Appellate Division has held that actions for dissolution of a deadlocked
corporation must be brought in a proceeding under the deadlock statute, and
are not the proper subject of an equity action, since the statutory method
of effecting corporate dissolution is exclusive and must be substantially
followed.67 On the other hand, the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals
has found inherent equity power to dispose of a cause that could not be made
to fit within the statute.8 '
"Black letter law" is of little aid in deciding this question, since the
determinative factor is probably the question of whether the legislature
intended to occupy the field, and absent legislative history, the answer must
lie in the words and context of the statute.69 It is arguable that the legis-
lature has only created a "new remedy for an existing common law cause
of action," and has manifested no intention whatsoever of providing an
exclusive remedy. 70 But one queries that at common law in Florida there
was a remedy for simple deadlock.7' It might be said in favor of the
continued existence of equity jurisdiction that the new deadlock statute
provides for involuntary dissolution of the corporation, something clearly
63. N. J. REV. STAT. § 14; 13-14 (1937).
64. N. Y. CEN. CoRP. LAw, § 172 (1896).
65. UNIFORM BusINEss CORPORATION ACT, § 51.
66. It probably applies to pre-existing corporations, see In re Collins-Doan Co., 61
A.2d 913 (N.J. Super. 1948). But see FLA. STAT. § 608.01 and Wright, Introduction
to the Statutory Corporation Law of Florida, 28 F.S.A. 51, 52 (1957).
67. Cachules v. Finkelstein, 279 App. Div. 173, 109 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1951).
68. Dorf v. Hill Bus Co., 140 N.J. Eq. 444, 54 A.2d 761 (1947).
69. Compare FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 7977 with I Am!. IUR. Actions § 12.
70. 1 AM. JUR. Actions § 12.
71. See Part 11 supra on Equity Receivers.
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never available before, and so deals with an entirely new area of relief. But
this cuts both ways; insofar as it is not a "new remedy for an existing
common law cause of action," there is a better case for exclusiveness. In
light of what little Florida law there is on the exclusiveness of statutory
remedies,72 and the very narrow coverage of this statute, it would seem the
Florida courts would reach a better conclusion by holding the deadlock
statute cumulative only, and not to preclude relief from inherent equity
power. The Florida legislature has not specifically said it desired to pre-empt
the field for the statutory remedy, and no implied negative should be read
into the statute in light of the pressing need for relief to parties in this
situation.7 '
Coverage of The Statute
In dealing with the relief available under the statute, the discussion
will consider first the situations that the statute by its language does and
does not cover, and secondly, the factors that will govern its being applied
in any particular case. The statutory scheme seems (a) to give the "circuit
court, sitting in chancery," jurisdiction over deadlock causes, and (b) to
subject the plaintiff to a requirement of showing that "the division of
ownership is equal and cannot be reconciled," and otherwise leaves the
granting of relief in the unbridled discretion of the chancellor.
The thrust of the statutory language is clearly at situations where
there is the division of fifty-fifty shareholders, or the deadlock of an even
board. The statute makes no requirement as a prerequisite to jurisdiction
that "irreparable injury" threaten the corporation, as does the Illinois
statute,74 nor does it require that the court only act if its action is "bene-
ficial to the stockholders ...and not injurious to the public' as the New
York statute does.)' The statute specifically allows a petition to be brought
by "any shareholder," and so differs from several statutes which require
a certain percentage of shareholders in addition to other conditions before
suit is allowed.78 As we shall later see, however, the numerical small
72. See McDaniel v. McElvy, 91 Fla. 770, 108 So. 820 (1926) (holds that a
statute is only cumulative by its express terms and does not divest equity courts of
pre-existing remedy of bill to quiet title); Soreno Hotel Co. v. State Ex Rdl Otis
Elevator Co., 107 Fla. 195, 114 So. 339 (1932) (Statute requiring secretary to keep
corporate books ready for inspection by specified persons held not to abrogate common
law right of stockholder to inspect records at proper time and place for proper purpose).
But see Therrell v. Rinaman, 107 Fla. 110, 144 So. 327 (1952) (legislature by providing
plain, complete, adequate method of bank receivership has made such liquidation purely
statutory and divested chancery of its jurisdiction, at least until statutory method proves
inadequate to protect rights).
73. One queries the wisdom of a court ever acting so as to vompletely divest a
party of a remedy without a specific and explicit legislative command to that effect.
But see LA. STAT. 12:558 (1950), where the Louisiana Legislature thought it necessary
to expressly state that the deadlock statute does not impair shareholder rights under a
general receivership statute.
74. ILL. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.86 (a)(1) (1954).
75. N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW, § 117 (1943).




percentage of the holdings of the petitioning parties may be a factor
entering into the exercise of the chancellor's discretion.
It would seem that this statute applies either when the board is dead-
locked, or when the shareholders cannot agree on a board so that the old
directors hold over. The disjunctive "or" between the first and second
clauses should be decisive to make these alternative remedies,7 7 and avoid
such decisions as Cook v. Cook, where the Massachusetts court, under a
statute since amended, held that both shareholder and board deadlock are
vital to dissolution. 8
The decisions seem to make ,it clear that dissolution for deadlock
cannot be avoided by the directors reelecting themselves, nor by their own
action filling a vacancy on the board; they cannot usurp the power of the
shareholders, and thus prevent the application of the shareholder deadlock
clause of the Florida statute.79 Likewise dissolution is available when there
is no actual deadlock on the board, when those in control of the corporation
avoid a deadlock by violating the provisions of the charter., An aggrieved
shareholder does not lose his right to relief because the misconduct of the
defendant prevents there actually being a deadlock.
It would seem that the requirement that "the old directors are holding
over" means that the shareholders must have passed an annual election
period without successfully electing a new board, and so a delay of up to one
year, after the inception of shareholder dissension, but before the parties
would become eligible for relief tinder the statute, may ensue, assuming
no management deadlock.81 The words "management of the corporation"
in the director deadlock clause probably will have no effect on the applica-
tion of the statute, since almost any conceivable director dispute would by
definition concern the affairs and management of the corporation. In
practice, it seems fair to predict that any question as to this language will
express itself in the chancellor's accepting jurisdiction, but applying his
discretion to deny relief because he considers the dispute non-vital to the
functioning of ihe corporation. 2
The statute as drafted seems to have made one vital omission: it
does not cover "vetoes," and/or the situations where board or director
activity is stalemated by a charter or statutory requirement for super-
majority.8 8 It is submitted that the statute cannot be read so as to cover these
situations. "Evenly" and "equally" are virtually synonymous as herein
77. See Petition of Collins-Doan Co., 3 N.J. 382, 70 A.2d 159, (1949).
78. 270 Mass. 534, 170 N.E. 455 (1930).
79. Petition of Williamson, 85 N.Y.S.2d 93 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
80. Application of Bankhalter, 128 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
81. Florida directors seemingly must be elected annually, see FLA. STAT. § 608.08,
and Orlando Orange Groves v. Hale, 107 F1a. 304, 144 So. 674 (1932). As to whether
there must have been an actual attempt and failure to elect directors, see text p. 410 infra.
82. See text p. 410 infra.
83: BALLANTINE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1057 (1953); O'NrAL,
CLOSE CORPORATIONS, LAw & PRACTICE, 9.29 (1958).
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used, and that they mean nothing less than fifty-fifty splits is reinforced
by the reiterated use of "one-half" in the statute in discussing the necessary
division.8 4 In a veto situation, the petitioning shareholder must find his
relief, if any, at equity.
5
It would seem clear that the director deadlock clause does not cover
the case of an uneven board of directors, stalemated by a veto requirement.
Probably this clause would not cover the situation where the plaintiff claims
the board is in fact even, since the oddman is just a "dummy." Several
New York cases have discussed this problem and reached no definite
conclusions, 86 but in light of the fact that the Florida statute refers to an
"uneven" board in the shareholder deadlock clause, an even board probably
must be shown to invoke the director deadlock clause, since the legislature
knew how to use "uneven" when it wanted to, and in the director clause,
must have deliberately chose not to. By parity of reasoning, probably the
statute will not apply when some directors on an uneven board are
incapacitated, or other events occur which happen to leave the corporation
with an even board at a particular moment.87
The Kay case is the sole judicial discussion of the statute as yet.88
There the court granted partition of the assets of a corporation holding
land for sale, on which the shareholders could not agree as to disposition.
In a dictum, the court noted the existence of 608.28, saying that this
statute recognizes "the necessity for providing for relief in instances of this
kind . . . [and] . . . would afford the [plaintiff] the relief he seeks . . .
[but for its effective date]."
Speculation is appropriate on several other matters which fall outside
the exact language of the statute. When the corporation has an even number
of directors who are not deadlocked but are holding over because the
shareholders are unable to elect successors, the shareholders deadlock clause
would not seem to apply because "the number of directors is [not] uneven."
Again one wonders at the result when the board is even and deadlocked,
but the shareholders are not quite evenly divided. Would the shareholders
have to wait until the next election passes to get relief upon failure to
84. New York has amended its deadlock statute so as to specifically handle veto
cases arising under § 9. N.Y. CEN. Coap. LAw, § 103 (Supp. 1957).
85. Cf. Bator v. United Sausage Co., 138 Conn. 18, 81 A.2d 442 (1951), where
the court seems to deny dissolution because of its distaste for extra-majority control
devices.
86. See e.g., In re McLoughlin, 176 App. Div. 653, 163, N.Y.S. 547 (1917)
(Directors can't be deadlocked even thought one of three is a dummy); Petition of
Binder, 172 Misc. 634, 15 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1939) (dummy director is director nonethe-
less), rev'd, 258 App. Div. 1041, 17 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1939) (remanded to determine
if the odd director was actually functioning as such).
87. In re Freidlieb, 184 N.Y.S. 753 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
88. Kay v. Key West Development Corp., 72 So.2d 786, 789 (Fla. 1954). See
however In ra Fredcris, Inc., 101 So.2d 49 (Fla. App. 1958), where a receiver was




elect successor directors? Would it even then be available, in the light
of the fact that the board ex hypothesi, is not uneven? In answering such
questions, it is submitted that remedial statutes of this sort would be better
construed liberally to afford relief, 9 unless the case, like the veto, is clearly
outside the statutory ken.
Discretion of the Chancellor
It is generally assumed that statutes of this type do not operate
automatically to dissolve corporations upon a petition which meets the
jurisdictional requirements. Whether a decree of dissolution will issue
is within the discretion of the chancellor.90 This view is consistent with
the Florida statutory language that "the court . . . may entertain a
petition . . . [and] . . . may appoint a receiver . . ." (emphasis added).
This part of the discussion will consider the standards and factors that
a Florida chancellor should consider in deciding how to exercise his
discretion.
It could be argued that because the statute requires that the court
find the ownership division to be "equal," and that it "cannot be recon-
ciled," the discretion of the court extends only to these two elements, and
once the court is satisfied on these two points, it cannot exercise its discretion
further.9 ' It is submitted that the better reading of the statute is that the
court must be at least satisfied on these two items, and it may consider
others, in view of (a) the fact that the legislature has specifically given
the administration of this statute to the "court, sitting in chancery" and
chancery is by tradition a discretionary court, and (b) the reading of the
statute itself: ". . . if . . . the court finds that the division of ownership
is equal and cannot be reconciled, he may appoint a receiver"."' (Emphasis
added.)
So far as the requirement of reconciliation is concerned, it seems to
express a legislative desire for flexibility in the exercise of the dissolution
power and the shaping of decrees. 2 The statute seems to suggest, over and
above the legislative desire to avoid corporate paralysis, that the legislature
recognizes that it is promulgating a drastic remedy.03 Accordingly the
chancellor must be completely satisfied that the deadlock before him is a
permanent one, and not the result of a temporary falling out. This seems
89. Cf.: Neville v. Leamington Hotel Corp., 47 So.2d 786, 789 (Fla. 1954).
90. Symposium, The Close Corporation, 52 Nw U. L. REv. 345 (1957), note
75 supra at 410; Strong v. Fromm Laboratories, 273 Wis. 159, 77 N.W.2d 389 (1956);
Petition of Collins-Doan Co., 3 N.J. 582, 70 A.2d 159 (1949), Paulman v. Kritzer
Radiant Coils Inc., 143 A.2d 272 (Del. Ch. 1958).
91. Expressio unius est exciusio alterius.
91a. See Paulman v. Kritzer Radiant Coils, Inc., 143 A.2d 272 (Del. Ch. 1958).
92. Cf. Handlan v. Handlan, 360 Mo. 1150, 232 S.W.2d 944 (1950); showing
the flexibility of decrees under deadlock statutes.
93. See BALLANTINE, CASES & MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1056-7 (1953).
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a clear instance of the legislature giving a remedy that it wants cautiously
used.
It seems to be the purport of this statutory language that an actual,
not potential deadlock is required. The statute seems to expressly state,
by requiring that the parties "cannot be reconciled," the usual requirement
under deadlock statutes even without such language; namely that equity
will not dissolve for reason only of the threat of a future stymie.04 'There
must be either a present board or shareholder deadlock, though some cases
give relief in a situation where there is no question whatsoever that
such would be the result of a board or shareholder meeting. 5
A related question, which will depend in each case on the facts
presented, and on which the decisions of the court often turns, is that
of how pervasive a deadlock the chancellor will require before granting
relief. The courts treat dissolution as a harsh and drastic remedy, and it is
doubtful that they will dissolve the corporation unless they are convinced
that a director deadlock goes to a vital and material aspect of corporate
operation.96 It is very questionable whether disagreement on a relatively
minor matter would be considered sufficient to invoke the chancellor's
action. Needless to say, when facts of usurpation of corporate control,
misuse of corporate property, and mismanagement of corporate affairs are
added to deadlock, the courts will be quicker to exercise their discretionary
power than when it appears that the conflict is peripheral to the operation
of the corporation and may be eventually reconciled.9 7
The New York and Illinois courts have seized on language in their
statutes, that does not appear in the Florida statute, to give them restricted
applications. The New York statute requires that a dissolution be "bene-
ficial to the stockholders,... and not injurious to the public."
0' 8 Relying on
this language, the courts in that state have followed the leading case of
Matter of Cantelmo0 seemingly into laying down a rule that a solvent,
going corporation can never be dissolved, because such action is ipso facto
not beneficial to all the shareholders, but only favors he who sues; and in
any case, the courts show an extreme reluctance to consider dissolution
for a solvent corporation. 100 The Wisconsin, New Jersey, and Missouri
courts have recently rejected this requirement under statutes, which like
94. See e.g., Application of Landau, 185 Misc. 876, 51 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1944).
95. Stark v. Reingold, 18 N.J. 231, 113 A.2d 679 (1955). (Though the case
may go on the fact that the court was granting dissolution of a partnership intertwined
in operation with the corporation, and felt the whole thing "one ball of wax".)
96. See e.g., Application of Bankhalter, 128 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct. 1953);
Application of Landau, 183 Misc. 876, 51 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1944).
97. See e.g., Application of George W. Anderson Inc.. 104 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Sup.
Ct. 1951), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 594, 107 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1951). (Marital difficulties
that have not deadlocked operation of corporation are not ground for dissolution.)
98. N.Y. GN. CORP. LAw, § 117 (1943).
99. 275 App. Div. 231, 88 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1949).




Florida's, do not use the word "benefit."' 0 1 It is submitted that the solvency
of a corporation is but one factor for the chancellor to consider.102 It is
admittedly easier to exercise discretion in favor of dissolving if the
corporation is obviously of no possible use to anyone, and should be wound
up to prevent further waste of assets. Nevertheless, the courts should not
allow this consideration to blind them and prevent recognition of the
fact that a deep and pervading conflict would lead almost ex necessite to
the reduction of value of the ownership interest. Therefore, in a severe
enough case, dissolution, by freeing paralyzed assets, would of itself be an
ipso facto benefit to the shareholders. 03
Another aspect of this reluctance to dissolve a going corporation may
be that the court will carry over the concepts that it has previously applied
in equity situations to proceedings under the deadlock statute. The courts
may well tend to require facts of frustration and paralysis of function and
purpose before allowing dissolution. Some courts have declined to dissolve
deadlocked corporations while there is yet a chance of profitability, or
otherwise place excess consideration on this factor.' 04 This may well be
a more stringent test than the statute was designed to promulgate, and
it is submiitted that under the statute, the court should balance any such
inclination by giving weight to the obvious legislative interest in furnishing
some relief in deadlock situations as such.105
The Illinois courts have also been strict in application of that state's
deadlock statute, placing a restrictive reading on the requirement of
"irreparable injury to the corporation."'" ° Although this language does
not appear in the Florida statute, it is quite possible that the Florida
courts, in exercising their discretion, will instigate some vestige of it
into their decisions. Again it is submitted that this factor should weigh
far less than in a state where the statute contains that explicit language.
Indeed, arguably the consequences of deadlock are themselves a threat of
"irreparable injury" to the corporation. 107
Some courts have given effect to a vague requirement of good faith
and clean hands on the part of the petitioning party.108 It may be that
101. Handlan v. Handlan, 360 Mo. 1150, 232 S.W.2d 944 (1950); Petition of
Collins-Doan Co., 3 N.J. 382, 70 A2d 159 (1949); Strong v. Fromm Laboratories,
273 Wis. 159, 77 N.W.2d 389 (1956).
102. See dissent in In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563
(1954); and see cases cited note 101 supra.
103. See Note, 19 FoRD. L. REV. 287 (1949).
104. See e.g., In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., note 102 supra.
105. Cf. Israels, note 6 supra.
106. Lush'us Distributors v. Ft. Dearborn Lith. Co., 330 Ill. App. 216, 70 N.E.2d7371 1946).
7. See e.g., Handlan v. Handlan, 360 Mo. 1150, 232 S.W.2d 944 (1950);
Petition of Collins-Doan Co., 3 N.J. 382, 70 A.2d 159 (1949).
108. See Petition of Adler, 277 App. Div. 861, 98 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1950); Matter
of Cantelmo, 275 App. Div. 231, 88 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1949); and see Ballard, Arrangements
for Participation in Corporate Management Under the Pa. Bus. Corp. Law, 25 TEMP.
L. Q. 131, 154 (1951). But see In re Jamison Steel Corp., 322 P.Zd 246 (Cal. App.
1958) (intimating that the question of clean hands may be irrelevant under a deadlock
statute, the question being whether there is a deadlock, not why).
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dissolution is harder to obtain when the petitioner is seeking the dissolution
for his own aggrandizement. Although it seems that every plaintiff stands
to profit- from the dissolution (else he would not so petition), 10 9 there
are cases where desire for dissolution goes beyond an understandable wish
to protect one's own interest. One such instance might be the "freeze
out," where the desire is to take out the assets, and reincorporate minus
the undesired party. But this could happen through voluntary dissolution,
and even there the courts do not uniformly enforce a requirement of good
faith on the majority. 110 It would seem that equity will not regard kindly
one who has voted to make a deadlock and now petitions for dissolution
where it is clear that he has not acted in good faith with regard to the
other shareholders, but how much good faith is required is not clear.
Some miscellaneous matters affecting equity discretion are worthy of
note. It may be that the adequacy of other available remedies may forestall
a dissolution. Considering the flexibility that the legislature has granted
him, and the harshness of the statutory remedy, a Florida chancellor would
be very likely to dismiss a petition if he could decree some less drastic
remedy to obviate the situation.' This is not to say that a less than
adequate alternative would be sufficient to deter dissolution, 6r that a
defendant could stall a receiver with a cross action to stay relief pending
consideration of some stop-gap remedy. 112
The percentage of stockholders bringing the suit may be important
to the chancellor. While the statute allows suit by "any stockholder" in
a deadlock situation, it is possible that the court will look askance at
anything resembling a minority "blackmail" suit." 3 It may be much
clearer that the dissolution will not accrue to the benefit of all the share-
holders (for whatever that's worth) when the petitioner is a very minority
sahreholder.Y4
In applying this statute, it is suggested that the Florida chancellor
would do well to emphasize two factors. The first is that the legislature, by
enacting the statute, has taken a therapeutic approach to the problem of
deadlock. It has recognized that such situations debilitate and demoralize
a vital business form, and a remedy has been specifically provided in an
area where it was questionable that one existed before. This militates
toward a sympathetic reading of the statute and its application whenever
possible to remedy the evil aimed at. On the other hand, there is something
to be said for a consideration of the parties' original intent. They entered
into a close corporation with their eyes open. In light of their original
109. See note 102 supra.
110. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 303 (rev. ed. 1946).
111. See Petition of Collins-Doan, 3 N.J. 382, 70 A.2d 159 (1949).
112. See Petition of Acker, 124 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 282 App. Div.
941, 126 N.Y.S,2d 194 (1953).
113. Cf. Note, 28 CALIF. L. REv. 219 (1940).




understanding, the court might well consider in a particular case whether
dissolution is really in the best interest of all concerned."'5
IV. PLANNING To HANDLE DEADLOCK PROBLEMS
It seems clear that the best way to handle deadlock situations in
Florida closed corporations is to plan ahead to meet them. This conclusion
is dictated, first, by the uncertainty of result in any given instance from
application of either equity's inherent power, or Florida's deadlock statute.16
To achieve a clear solution to the problems of embattled "partners," it is
imperative that as little reliance as possible he placed on the ability to
predict in advance how the courts will decide, and as much reliance as
possible on private advance planning by the parties, even as they plan to
meet future tax or business expansion situations. Indeed, several situations
fraught with danger for the wellbeing of a corporation and its stockholders,
such as continual dissension which never attains the dignity of a deadlock,
are simply not suceptible of judicial relief as the law today stands. Secondly,
planning affords a chance to actually give the parties what they desire.
Neither the statutes nor equity make a strong pretense of according with
the parties' intent or original understanding. Rules of law are general
rules, to be generally applied. If the parties consider their situation peculiar
(and evey closed corporation has a different peculiar problem), then
insofar as legally possible, it should be discussed, thought out, and some
attempt at reconciliation made in advance. Litigation is costly and uncer-
tain, particularly for small investors, and its consequences on the parties
in a family-held corporation speak for themselves.
Practical Aspects of Planning
It must be emphasized that the problems of each corporation must
be considered separately. There is not and cannot be any one plan to
handle deadlock situations that is universally applicable. Each group of
people will have different business, financial and personality problems, and
these must be determinative of the substance of each plan.1"
The lawyer who counsels the corporate form has the responsibility
to his clients of considering all the facets of the parties' situation, and
bringing to their attention both the chances of deadlock and dissension,
and plans to ameliorate the effect of such difficulties on the corporation.
There are a plethora of relevant problems. It will be vital to determine
what the parties have contributed to the business and what they expect
115. Cf. Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business
Corporation Act, 34 NC. L. Ruv. 432, 449 (1956).
116. See discussion under Parts II and III supra, and see O'NEAL, CLOSED CosuPots-
IoNts 9.03 (1958).
117. Cf. O'NEAL, supra note 116 at 9.06.
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to get out of it." 8 When one of the parties expects to donate his personal
services, and the other risk capital, they will be inclined to have different
ideas as to control, and the aftermath of deadlock. It will be no less
important to evaluate the nature of the corporation and the type of business
that it will be. A relatively inactive corporation, as one set up to sell a
particular asset, is less likely to be adversely affected by dissension than
a manufacturing or merchandising corporation which requires daily decisions.
Indeed, the more active the corporation, the more likely it is to engender
the friction that can lead to corporate paralysis,"19 since much depends
on the people themselves who will be involved. The lawyer is not expected
to be a clinical psychologist, but he must make allowances in his planning
for at least the most obvious possible sources of difficulty. His function
is to detect the trouble spots, and help the parties to avoid them.
The truly basic question may be whether the clients really want
control devices with a high potential for deadlocks. Some parties will
demand a voice in the business even if it threatens a future paralysis.
Others are certain that no matter what their personal relations, they can
continue to operate the business. People are notoriously unable to forecast
the future, and if the nature of the business and interests of the parties is
in any way conducive to future dissension, the attorney would be well
advised to plan for the parties at least some compromise solution for future
trouble. The parties may recoil at the idea of making it easier to break up
a prosperous business, but they will almost surely have other objectives
than just business permanence, and a tailor-made planning device will be
necessary to aid them to attain these other objectives.
Basically there are three types of planning devices that are useful in
this close corporation context: a) those that make dissolution easier,
b) those that make it harder, c) those that preserve to corporation as a
going concern, perhaps through buy-and-sell agreements. Combinations of
these may be necessary in any particular case. Solution (a) looks to the
ending of the corporate life. This can involve both problems of a "freeze
out" of the minority, 120 and minority "blackmail," when the small owner
oppresses the majority by holding over them, as a veritable Sword of
Damocles, his power to force an end to the corporate existence) 2' Indeed
the prospect of planning to allow the dissolution of a solvent and prosper-
ous corporation always seems distasteful to some. That it makes the
business unstable is likely to differ in importance in the plans of the
parties. A clash in their interests will probably necessitate a compromise
118. It may be very helpful to even plan in advance the distribution of assets upon
dissolution. See Mohawk Carpet Mills v. Delaware Rayon Co., 110 A.Zd 305 (Del.
Ch. 1954).
119. See Note, Voluntary Dissolution of a Close Corporation in New York, 1
SYRAcUsE L. REv. 489, 92-3 (1949)
120. See Hornstein, Voluntary Dissolution - A New Development in Intra.Corporate
Abuse, 51 YALE L.J. 64, 67 (1941).
121. Cf. Note, 28 CALIF. L. REv. 219 (1940).
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plan, such as use of a buy-out. A partial solution may be a well drafted
plan for distribution of the corporate assets on dissolution, so that each
party will get back as nearly as possible what he has put in,122 though it
goes without saying that one who has put in personal energy and services
can never recover them to full value on corporate dissolution.
Approach (b) making it harder to dissolve the corporation, has the
basic drawback of fostering, or at least not relieving, deadlocks. It does
have the advantage of preventing "blackmail" by small shareholders. The
buy-out approach (c) may be the most feasible, particularly when used
with some combination of the first two. Its virtue is that it gives those
shareholders who desire to continue the corporation an opportunity to
acquire the other's stock at a mutually acceptable price. 123 This is a
particularly feasible provision when the option accrues in favor of a group
of more than a majority, though one perhaps not large enough to control
the corporate operation and avoid the deadlock, since many of the problems
with the buy-out will be financial. 12 4 It may be asking too much to expect
the parties to be able to muster sufficient capital to buy the other out at
some indefinite time in the future. One solution to the financial problems
may be for the corporation to buy the shares of the party who desires to
leave the corporation; 125 an advantage of continuing the going corporation
is that it will insure each stockholder of getting a better return on his
investment than if he were to receive only a pro rata share of tangible assets.
One problem in the buy-out that may arise is the delightful quandary of
which shareholder gets to buy the other out when they are fifty-fifty owners
and deadlocked.1
26
It is suggested that the basic solution for the problems of dissension
and deadlock should be for the draftsman to approach the parties as if
they were partners, which they would probably be "but for" utilization
of the corporate form. Partners can generally leave at will, and no reason
of philosophy or practical necessity militates a contrary result in a closed
corporation. If a shareholder "wants out," he should be able to have the
other shareholders buy him out, or be allowed to dissolve the corporation, '
27
nor need this be on the sole contingency of deadlock. A desire to leave
122. See note 118 supra.
123. A fair formula price should be stated in the charter. A convenient one may
already be there for stock restrictions, and it can be incorporated by reference. Another
solution might be to incorporate the procedure set out in FLA. STAT. § 608.23 for
payment to dissatisfied shareholders upon merger.
* 124. Hays, Shareholder Rights in the Iowa Corporation, 40 IowA L.Rrv. 459, 485
(1956).
125. But a corporation may be able to purchase its own shares only if it does not
thereby impair its capital, and this may take a promise to purchase by the corporation
illusory, and preclude the enforcement of the agreement. Topken, Loring and Schwartz,
Inc. v. Schwartz, 249 N.Y. 206, 163 N.E. 735 (1928), and see FLA. STAT. § 608.13
(9) (b), allowing purchases only from "surplus".
126. Hays, supra note 124.
127. See Winer, Proposing a N.Y. "Close Corporation" Law, 28 CoRK. L. Q. 313
(1943).
1959]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
may well anticipate or itself be a cause of deadlock and should be inde-
pendently allowed for. Exceptions to this general rule might be made in
cases where the other shareholders are so totally committed in resources to
the corporation that disaster to their interests would ensue if a disgruntled
shareholder had the right to force a buy-out or dissolution. This points
up the need to plan for individual cases, and to balance the corporate
permanence against individual desires.
Legal Aspects of Planning
The pervading legal problem in this area is the lack of direct prece-
dent.12 Many of the devices that will be herein explained are untested and
innovations. They may run into trouble in the courts (a) because of an
express or implied conflict with the corporate scheme, or (b) because
of a judicial reluctance to grant even closed corporations the partnership-
type advantages that these devices entail. 129 Nevertheless, they are supported
by analogy to authority in related areas, and to a degree, lawyers and their
clients will have to "assume the risks," depending on how badly they need
to use a particular plan.
Since many of the same legal problems are applicable to several of
the devices, some of the possible plans that seem most feasible in Florida
will be set forth, and the legal objections to them will be discussed
seriatim. Those planning for Florida corporate dissension might consider
the following:
1. One of the best and most versatile of the suggestions is that of
an agreement between the shareholders, or a by-law and charter provision,
that upon the happening of certain contingencies, an option to purchase
the stock of some of the shareholders would accrue in favor of the others.
Among the operative contingencies might be a prolonged period of dead-
lock on the board or among the stareholders, death of a stockholder,
inactivity in corporate affairs of a shareholder, dissension of any kind
among the parties; or the buyout might be used as a prerequisite to
dissolution by any party. The price should be set by a fair formula in the
original agreement, both because it will thereby earn wider support among
128. See e.g., O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS 9.05 (1958).
129. See Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 435 (1953). Concern for the rights of creditors may also sway the
courts against these plans, Symposium, The Close Corporation, 52 Nw. U. L. REv.
345, 351-352 (1957). The new North Carolina statute specifically provides that such an
agreement should not be "invalid as between the parties thereto, on the ground that
it is an attempt by the parties thereto to treat the corporation as if it were a partnership
or arrange their relationship in a manner that would be appropriate only between
partners .... ." N.C. STAT. 55-736.
130. See Cary, How Illinois Corporations May Enjoy Partnership Advantages: Planning
for the Closely Held Firm, 48 Nw. U. L. Rrv. 427, 59 (1953). The CAL. CORP. CODE,
§ 4658, provides by statute for a buy-out in case of deadlock.
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the stockholders, and because it will make the scheme appear more
reasonable in the court's eyes.
2. Another popular device is that of a shareholder agreement making
it easier or harder to get dissolution. This could take the form of an
agreement that all would vote their shares for dissolution upon a future
contingency, or that only in limited instances would anyone attempt to
dissolve the corporation. 13' Since the Florida voluntary dissolution statute
requires a preliminary board resolution, the agreement for easier dissolution
should also contain a "best efforts" clause in which the shareholders agree
to attempt to influence the decision of the board.
132
3. As a separate device, the agreements described above might be
inserted in the charter and by-laws of the corporation itself.
4. Florida's voluntary dissolution statute'3 3 specifically allows the certi-
ficate of incorporation or by-laws to require more than a majority vote of
the shareholders for the approval of a resolution of dissolution. By requiring
a high percentage for approval, a Florida draftsman can effectively stay
the threat of a majority "freeze-out," and give a small shareholder the
means of continuing to enjoy corporate prosperity.134
5. At the time of incorporation, the board, as an initial act, might
pass an undated resolution of dissolution, and at the same time the
shareholders would agree that if at any time in the future dissension
arose, they would vote to approve such resolution and assure its adoption.1815
6. The voting trust may be a means of avoiding the harm of a deadlock
or preventing dissolution by a minority. 3 6 The corporate stock would be
transferred to voting trustees with power in them to vote shares for
dissolution upon occurrence of specified events, or on a simple determination
that dissolution is in the best interest of all shareholders. The beneficial
owner would have all the rights of shareholders except the right to vote
for dissolution, and the agreement is set forth in the shares of the voting
131. Israels, note 6 supra, at 791-2. Compare Hornstein, Stockholder Agreements
in the Closely Held Corporation, 59 YALE L. 1. 1040, 1046-1047 (1950). The agreement
might alternatively take the form of an irrevocable proxy. See Smith v. San. F. & N. P.
Ry., 115 Cal. 584, 57 Pac. 582 (1897); Deibler v. The Chas. A. Elliott Co., 368 Pa.
267, 81 A.2d 557 (1951).
132. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 43 (rev. ed. 1946).
133. FLA. STAT. § 608.27 (1957).
134. Indeed, in view of the explicit language of the statute, this may be one of the
few planning devices clearly available in Florida. See the discussion on waiver and
mandatory statutes infra. Cf. Cary, note 130 supra, at 438-9.
135. Comment, Rights of the Minority Shareholders to Dissolve the Closely Held
Corporation, 43 CAL. L. REv. 514, 520 (1955). Note that under FLA. STAT. § 608.27,
the Secretary of State, with whom the resolution of dissolution must be filed, must
satisfy himself that the statutory requirements have been met before he allows the
corporation to dissolve. Whether he could disapprove of this technique is an unanswered
question.
136. ONEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS 9.07 (1958); De Marco v. Paramount Ice Co.,
102 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Sup. Ct. 1950). See Comment The lncorp rated Partnership and
the Problem of the Deadlocked Board, 3 VILL. L. REv. 196 (1958).
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trust certificates, and it is there clearly provided that transfers are subject
to the contract. 31 7
Such a voting trust seems valid in Florida, in light of section 608.43
of the Florida statutes, which provides for such agreements for a maximum
period of ten years, and for such "conditions, limitations, and instructions
as to the manner in which the vote shall be cast upon any proposition"
as is provided in the voting trust agreement. There might be some questions
as to statutory interpretation here,5 8 but it would seem that a voting trust
to solve the horrors of dissension and deadlock is one for a legitimate
business purpose and will promote the best interests of the corporation. 139
The accrual of an option, or buy-out, technique seems clearly valid.
Several cases have explicitly upheld the validity of a buy-out on a specified
contingency. 140 When such a buy-out is reasonable and fair, it should be
as readily upheld as are the like restrictions on stock transfers, which are
valid in Florida.'41
Probably the major attack that these planning devices will have to
meet is the charge that they alter the results available by statute, and since
the statute is mandatory, not permissive, in prescribing methods of dissolution
and handling of deadlocks, such plans cannot be allowed. Conversely, the
Florida courts will have to decide whether a shareholder can waive the
benefits of such a statutory scheme and this will turn on whether the
statute is one enacted for the protection of the public generally, or whether
it is designed solely for the protection of individual rights. 4 2
The leading case in this area is Leventlhal v. Atlantic Finance
Corporation."s There two sole shareholders and the corporation agreed
(a) that the corporation could be dissolved by notice of one shareholder
to the other unless the one notified should purchase the other's shares
at a designated price, and (b) for a right of dissolution in one on the
137. A voting trust might also be used to break an existing deadlock by having
the parties assign all their stock to it with the voting trustees managing the company.
Peck v. llorst, 175 Kan. 479, 264 P.2d 888 (1953), aff'd on rehearing, 176 Kan. 581,
272 P.2d 1061 (1954).
138. The question has been raised as to whether the statute provides for a true
voting trust, or a voting pool. Wright, Introduction to the Statutory Corporation Law
of Florida, 18 F.S.A. 51, 94-5, but its use in this context seems valid. See discussion
of Florida Statute in Watkins, The Development of Voting Trust Legislation, 35 U. DET.
L. REv. 595, 610-11 (1958).
139. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 184 (rev. ed. 1946).
140. Lewis v. H. P. Hood & Sons, 331 Mass. 670, 121 N.E.2d 830 (1954) (stock-
holder must sell stock to corporation when board of directors decides to redeem);
Thompson v. J. D. Thompson Carnation Co., 279 Il. 54, 116 N.E. 648(1917) (transfer
of control on death); N. England T. Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N.E. 432 (1849)
sale at death). See Greater New York Carpet House v. t-lerschmann, 258 App. Div.
49, 17 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1940).
141. Weissman v. Lincoln Corporation, 76 So2d 478 (Fla. 1954).
142. 12 Am. JUs. Contracts § 166; Annot., Waiver or Limitation by Contract
Between Shareholders of their Statutory Right to Cause Dissolution of a Corporation,
154 A.L.R. 269.
143. 316 Mass. 194, 55 N.E.2d 20 (1944).
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happening of certain contingencies. The court held this valid though it
waived the provisions of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 155, section 50,
relating to both voluntary and deadlock dissolution. The court found the
statute permissive; that a waiver of it was not violative of public policy;
and that corporate dissolution could be controlled by private agreement.
It should be emphasized that the statute in question had the introductory
clause: "unless otherwise provided in the agreement of association," and
though the charter in this case did not contain this agreement, the court
felt that such language in the statute indicated legislative approval of
private agreements on dissolution.144 Such language is lacking in the Florida
statutes on voluntary and involuntary dissolution. 145 but the Leventhal
holding is broad enough to retain high persuasiveness in Florida.146
A Florida case that may be helpful in this dissolution planning area
is Clearwater Citrus Growers Ass'n v. Andrews, 47 going on a theory of
estoppel that seems very close to waiver. The Florida court held that
former members of a corporation who had previously attempted to dissolve
it by methods foreign to the statutory plan would not be later heard to
ask for dissolution in accord with the statute, notwithstanding that they
could have obtained dissolution by acting properly in the first instance.
The logic here reaches the same result as a waiver. One who acts in a
preconceived way in regard to planning for dissolution should not be
heard later to deny such a plan's validity. 48
Another problem that may arise involves the question of whether the
statutory scheme for dissolution is mandatory and exclusive or merely
directory and permissive. The law in this area is vague and uncertain, and the
decision must turn on the court's determination of the intended coverage
of the Florida statute. The language of the statutes is admittedly explicit,
but absent any clear legislative intent to usurp the field,' 49 there is strong
authority, and also strong policy reasons supporting private planning in
this area. The Leventhal case is solid authority for holding such statutes
merely permissive, and allowing the parties to contract to vary them, 50
144. Accord, RKO Theatres v. Trenton- New Brunswick Theatres, 8 N.J. Sup. 404,
72 A.2d 914 (1950).
145. FLA. STAT. §§ 608.27, 608.28 (1957).
146. Florida also seems to hold that one can waive a statutory remedy. See e.g.,
Bellaire Securities Corp. v. Brown, 124 Fla. 47, 83, 168 So. 625, 648 (1956); though
the question has never arisen in a dissolution context.
147. 81 Fla. 299, 87 So. 903 (1921).
148. See Note, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 514, 521 n. 35.
149. Note, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 514, feels the mandatory statute argument very
strong in California. But it should be noted that their statutes are extremely detailed
and comprehensive, while FLA. STAT. § 608.27-28 are rather sketchy.
150. Accord, St. John of Vizzine v. Cavallo, 134 Misc. 152, 234 N.Y.S. 685 (1929)
(percentage for voluntary dissolution only permissive, since this is not a mandatory
statute to carry out public policy).
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though there are cases going the other way.' 5 The Florida statutes seem
designed to protect shareholders, not the public at large,15 2 and the problem
really boils down to the same question at issue in waiving statutory
benefits; whether private arrangements to affect dissolution are against
public policy. It would seem that the policy argument strongly favors such
arrangements, rather than disapproving them.15 Conceptions of the cor-
porate entity have changed, and it is now often recognized that closed
corporations are but "chartered partnerships". As such, the parties are
entitled to the greater freedom to chart their own fate than they would
have in actual partnership. By planning, they are taking reasonable steps
to solve problems really not adequately handled by the statutes or court
decisions. 154 In short, the parties have indeed chosen the corporate form,
but this choice is not sufficient reason for requiring them to continue in
it to their detriment. With no stronger reason than the language of the
statutes for holding them exclusive in regard to dissolution, private inten-
tions should be honored.
It should be noted that there may be a difference in the courts' approach
to the validity of such plans, depending on whether they expand or limit
the right to dissolve. 5 Generally the expanded right to dissolve must
still be in terms of the statutory methods, since there is no private method
of dissolution. The parties might agree to. liquidate the corporate assets,'"8
and leave the shell to be forfeited for failure to pay taxes. 157 It has been
suggested that courts will treat more severely those agreements that limit
the right to obtain dissolution.58 It is thought that the judicial trends
relaxing the right to obtain liquidation and dissolution, and the spirit of
the deadlock statutes mitigate against such schemes. It would not seem
that this reasoning would extend to invalidate an agreement that requires
one who desires dissolution to first offer shares to the other shareholders.' 5
While this is but one aspect of the general question of waiving statutory
151. See Shrage v. Portsmouth Steel Corp., 207 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1953) (Ohio
statute that only a certain percentage of shareholders can petition for dissolution is
exclusive); Merlino v. Fresno Macaroni .Mfg. Co., 64 Cal. App.2d 462, 148 P.2d 884
(1944) (California buy-out on deadlock statuite is mandatory).
152. See O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS 9.06 (1958).
153. Supporting the view that shareholder agreements for dissolution are not violative
of public policy, see Fish v. Nebraska City Barb-Wire Fence Co., 25 Fed. 795 (C.C.D.
Neb. 1885); and Wolf v. Arant, 88 Ga. App. 568, 77 S.E.2d 116 (1953).
154. Cf. Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Comb. Shows v. Ringling, 53 A.2d
441,447 (Del. 1946).
155. Homstein, Judicial Tolerance of the lneorporated Partnership, 18 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 435, 448-449 (1953). See cases cited in note 169 infra.
156. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 301 (rev. ed. 1946).
157. FLA. STAT. § 608.36 (1957).
158. Note 155 supra. Re Peveril Cold Mines 1898 1 Ch. (Eng.) 122, C.A.
(shareholders' statutory right to dissolve can't be limited by the articles of association,
since the right to dissolve is a condition of incorporation. But the question whether
there could be a valid contract between the company and individual shareholders
limiting the right to dissolve is reserved.)
159. See Note, Deadlock Dissolution in New York 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300, 305
(1952).
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remedies, it is an area in which the court may be quicker to find public
policy objections. E.ven if this dichotomy in judicial approach is true, provi-
sions requiring that a party seeking dissolution show a grave difference of
opinion as to management might be valid while broader limitations would
be in more danger of being invalidated. 60
An important problem for the draftsman will be that of where to
place the plan. In the context in which we are discussing such planning,
it is assumed that all the shareholders agree in advance on the proposition.
The draftsman must choose between the by-laws, the charter and a share-
holder agreement for the effective document. As we shall see, there are
certain legal objections to each. It has therefore been suggested that
arrangements of this sort should be placed in all the instruments, with
the corporation joining in the shareholder agreement.' 6 '
For a deadlock plan' to be placed in the charter, it must be of the type
authorized by the Florida "optional clauses" statute, 608.03 (2) (j). The
language there is broad, and the 1953 deletion of the clause formerly
contained therein to the effect that it does not authorize provisions "contrary
to the law of the State"' 02 may be a significant factor in support of inclusion
of plans for dissolution 1 1 But, such a provision is at the least unusual
in a charter,6 4 and to the extent that it appears to conflict with the
statutory language of dissolution, it invites invalidation. 1 5
The scope of matter that can be included in a by-law is of course
greater, but many of the same objections are applicable. A by-law does
have the advantage, however, of possibly being held a valid contract, even
though bad as a by-law.166
The legal status of a shareholder agreement on dissolution in Florida
is uncertain. Probably such an agreement could bind the parties to the
extent of specific performance. 6 7 It is unclear how the Florida courts will
handle the objections that such an agreement is an attempt to make a
160. See note 155 supra.
161. Cf. Note, Stock Transfer Restrictions in Closely Held Corporations, 10 U. FLA.
L. Ri.v. 54 (1957).
162. FLA. STAT. § 612.03 (10) (1953); and see present text FLA. STAT. § 608.03
(2) (J) (1957) supra note 2.
165. O'Neal, 10 VANs. L. REv. 1, supra note 4. Though the mere presence of an
optional clause statute doesn't prove the statute is not exclusive. 43 CAUV. L. Rev.
519-20 (1955), and see note 135 supra.
164. 10 VANsD. L. REv. 1, 24 (1956), and see note 4 supra. See BALLANTIVE,
COaPORATIOS § 16 (rev. ed. 1946),' casting doubt on the value of the "optional
clause" section.
165. See 48 Nw. U. L. REv. note 130 supra, at 427, 437-8.
166. Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1951).
167. Such Florida cases as Coldfarb Novelty Co. v. Vann, 94 So.2d 845 (Fla. 1957)
assume that shareholder agreements are enforcible against all parties concerned; and
see Bohnsack v. Detroit Tool Co., 292 Mich. 167, 290 N.W. 367 (1940) granting
specific performance of a buy and sell agreement on death of a shareholder. See also
Trau, Florida's Corporate Code: Draftsmanship and Practice, 12 U. MrATh L. Rev. 43,
69, 72 (1958), counseling use of shareholder agreements for restrictions on stock
transfer. Cf. Blanchard v. Commonwealth Oil Co., 91 So.Zd 803 (FMa. 1956) (semble).
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partnership out of a corporation. 168 Courts in other states have split on
the validity of such agreements. 169
Two New York decisions illustrate the problem. In Re Blocks Will' 70
held that an agreement between sole shareholders requiring dissolution under
certain circumstances was valid. Flanagan v. Flanagan'7' held an agreement
between two shareholders, owning 58/60 of the corporate stock, that on
the happening of certain contingencies the corporate assets would be
distributed between them was contrary to public policy and unenforcible.
The court denied the parties the right to deal with the property as if it
were owned individually, or as partners. Mr, Hornstein thinks shareholder
agreements for dissolution are difficult to support in light of the latter
case, 72 but Mr. Israels disagrees, noting that the agreement at issue in
the Flanagan case was not phrased in terms of shareholder voting for
dissolution, but in terms of requiring distribution of corporate property.
ie thinks a better drawn agreement would have been upheld. 73
A planner would be wise to place notice of an existent dissolution
agreement on the stock certificate to insure all subsequent shareholders
taking with notice. 7 4 It should be noted that in placing provisos in the
charter and by-laws, a risk of administrative limitation is incurred, in that
the secretary of state may decline to approve a charter containing such
unusual clauses. 175 Indeed he may be an obstacle to dissolution, for 607.27
seems to give him discretion in accepting dissolutions.
The more clearly that a plan conflicts with the Florida statutory
scheme for dissolution, the poorer are its chances for survival. 76 The
buy-out seems clearly valid, and a good case can be made out that share-
holder agreements on dissolution violate no public policy, and should be
sustained in a closed corporation even if they do give some partnership
advantages. 1
77
The problems of dissesion and deadlock are vital to Florida's closed
corporations. To a limited extent, relief is available through litigation.
168. See note 129 surd.
169. See e.g., Fish v. Nebraska City Barb-Wire Fence Co., 25 Fed. 795 (C.C.D.Neb.
1885) (agreement to dissolve if majority of board decides business not profitable is valid);
Wolf v. Arant, 88 Ga. App. 568, 77 S.E.2d 116 (1953) (agreement to vote for dissolution
valid); Application of Cohen, 183 Misc. 1034, 53 N.Y.S.2d 671 (contract to arbitrate
can't stay right to dissolve).
170. 60 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Supp. Ct. 1946).
171. 273 App. Div. 918, 77 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1948).
172. 59 YALE L. J. 1040, 1047 (1950).
173. 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 778, 792 (1952).
174. Though notice need not be more than incorporation by reference. See Note,
Stock Transfer Restrictions in Closely Held Corporations, 10 U. FA, L. REv. 54, 60-2
(1957).
175. See FLA. STAT. § 608.04, on administrative approval for the beginning of
corporate existence, and 10 VAND. L. REv. 1, 22-3 (1956), supra note 4.
176. Requiring that the majority act in good faith in dissolving, for instance, might
well be good even if the language of the statute is mandatory, since the right to
dissolve is not absolute. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 305 (rev. ed. 1946).
177, Cf. Israels, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 778 1952, supra note 6.
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Though the law on planning is uncertain, to the extent possible, problems
should be anticipated and disposed of at the time of incorporation. It is
hoped that the courts and bar will come to recognize parties in a closed
corporation as partners in a dissension situation, and deal with them
accordingly.178
178. Cf. note, 36 TEXAs L. Rv. 660 (1958).
